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MASTER-SERVANT-SUBROGATION-RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO
RECOVER FOR INJURIES TO A SoLDIER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT AcT OF
ANOTHER-On February 7, 1944, an enlisted soldier in the Army of the
United States was injured in a traffic accident in Los Angeles, California,
through the negligence of an agent of appellant; he was incapacitated for duty
for a period of twenty-nine days. The Uni~ed States paid his hospital expenses,1
and also his salary during this period, amounting to a total of $192.56. In
March, 1944, the soldier, in return for three hu11dred dollars, executed a release
to appellant "from any and all claims and demands" 2 on account of the accident.
The United States sued in the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of California to recover the total of its payments during th~ soldie<s incapacity,8
basing its claim on an extension of the common law action of a master for damages resulting froµi loss of services of a servant. 4 The district court- gave judgment for the United States. On appeal, held, reversed. The United States cannot recover for hospital expenses and salary of a soldier injured by the negligence of a third person. Standard Oil Company of California v. United States,
(C.C.A. 9th, 1946) 153 F. (2d) 958.
This case is one of first impression in the circuit court of appeals; the extent
of precedent elsewhere is meager. In the only other case on the subject in the
United States,5 recovery was denied. Cases in the British Empire and Commonwealth add little. The question arose first in England, in Attorney-General
v. Valle-Jones,6 in 1935. The right to recovery was evidently not in issue; the
bulk of the opinion was directed at the question of damages. The court answered
the defendant's fear of double liability by stating, as a matter of course, that
the injured soldier could collect only once. 7 This is contrary to the usual
American rule,8 followed in California, which states that recovery by the injured party is not diminished by the receipt of payments through insurance, a
contract of employment, or gratuity. A similar question arose in Canada, in
1943,_in an action against the Crown.9 The Exchequer Court held that the
relation of government and soldier was not that of master and servant; Parlia1
The duty of the United States to pay hospital expenses of members of the armed
services is established by statute. 54 Stat. L. 885 at ~86 (1940), 50 U.S.C. (1940),
Appx., §303(d); Army Regulations 40-505, §2.
2
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, (D.C. Cal. 1945) 60 F.
Supp. 807 at 813.
8
Id., 60 F. Supp. 807.
4 See note I 5, infra.
5
United States v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (D.C. N.C. 1946) 64 F. Supp.
289.
6
[1935] 2 K.B. 209.
71d. at 218.
8
Cunnien v. Superior Iron Works Co.,_ 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921);
18 A.L.R. 678 (1922); Shea v. Rettie, 287 Mass. 454, 192 N.E. 44 (1934); 95
A.L.R. 575 (1935); 4 ToRTS REsTATEMENT, §920, comment e, §924, comment c
and comment f (1939). For the rule in California, which determined the law applicable to this case, see Per1 v. Los Angeles Junction Ry., 22 Cal. (2d) III, 137 P.
(2d) 441 (1943).
, 9
McArthur v. The King, [1943] Exch. Can. R. 77, [1943] 3 D.L.R. 225.

RECENT DECISIONS

III

ment amended the Exchequer Court Act to provide that such is the relationship,1°
and since then recovery against the Crown as master has been allowed. 11 In
Australia, the sole appearance of the question was the case of C ommanwealth v.
Quince, 12 where recovery was denied, the court being unwilling to invent a new
liability arising out of a status "that in some way resembles the relationship of
master and servant." 18 Following the lead of the Valle-Jones case,14 where
the answer evidently was taken for granted, the question has uniformly been
argued as one of master and servant. It is felt that the differences between the
government-soldier relation and the relation that at common law supported a
master's action for loss of services of his servant are sufficiently radical to preclude extending the older action to the instant situation.15 It can be argued that
10
Exchequer Court Act, §50 A, Can Rev. Stat. (1927) c. 34, as amended, 7 Geo.
6, c. 25, §1. The relevant portion of the statute is as follows: "For the purpose of determining liability in any action or other proceeding by or against His Majesty, a person
who was at any time since the twenty-fourth day of June, one thousand nine hundred
and thirty-eight, a member of the naval, military or air forces of His Majesty in right
of Canada shall be deemed to have been at such time a servant of the Crown."
11
Gauthier & Co. Ltd. v. The King, (Can. Exch. 1944) [1944] 2 D.L.R. 273;
Tremblay v. The King, (Can. Exch. 1944) [1944] 2 D.L.R. 338; LaPerriere v.
The King, (Can. Exch. 1945) [1946] 1 D.L.R. 431.
.
12
[1943] Queensland St. Rep. 199; affirmed on appeal, [1943] 68 Commonwealth L. Rep. 227.
18
[1943] Queensland St. Rep. 199, 201. The court adds, at p. 205, "The,
services of the airman were made due by statute and I feel that I cannot extend the
anomaly of a master's right to sue for loss of contracted services to a right in the Crown
to sue for loss of statutory services; I think it proper to leave to the legislature the
responsibility for introducing such an action."
·
11 Note 6, supra.
15 Some text writers have stated the common law' doctrine very generally, e.g.,
WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT, §223 (1877), and DIAMOND, THE LAw OF MASTER
AND SERVANT, art. 103 (1932). The cases, however, do not support the broad proposition. Most of the cases relied on fall into two classes: actions arising out of injury
to a member of plaintiff's immediate family or his menial servant, and actions arising
out of the seduction of plaintiff's daughter or his menial servant, where recovery was
based on the fiction of loss of services. Latterly, though actions are generally allowed
for intentional interference with the master-servant relation [See 4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, §766, §767 (1939) ], the overwhelming trend is against allowing recovery
based on negligence, except as limited to personal servants. See 31 HARV. L. REV.
1017 (1918); Carpenter, "Interference With Contract Relations," 41 HARV. L.
REV. 728 at 738 (1928); Green, "Relational Interests," 29 ILL. L. REv. 1041 at
1043 (1935); 23 CAL. L. REv. 420 at 424 (1934). Wigmo.re, "Interference With
Social Relations," 21 AM. L. REV. 764 (1887), points out the limited scope of the
original action. For a view favoring extension of the action, see 18 CoRN. L. Q. 292
(1933). The only recent case in the United States allowing recovery by a master for
loss of services of a servant from the negligence of another is Darmour Production
Corp. v. Herbert M. Baruch Corp., 135 Cal. App. 351, 27 P.(2d) 664 (1933),
criticized in 23 CAL. L. REv. 420 (1934). Of older American cases, there are two
that support this position: Woodward v. Washburn, 3 Denio (N.Y.) 367 (1846), and
Ames'v. Union Ry. Co., 117 Mass. 541 (1875).
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since the governme.Q.t is under a duty to pay salary and hospital expenses of an
,injured soldier,16 it might well be subrogated to the soldier's right. It is possible
to take the position, following the conclusions of the trial court, that though the
relation between government and soldier is not strictly' one of master and servant, nonetheless there exists a ·status, of which the controlling incidents are a
right to services and control over their performance, and that therefore the
essential elements of the master-servant relation are present. Though the logical
force of these analyses is recognized, it is felt that since the relation in question
is one wholly created and delineated by statute, it is the part of Congress rath.er
than the courts to embellish it with further rights and remedies, and that failure
of Congress to' provide for such an action as the present one can safely be taken
to indicate that it is not desired.11
John R. Dykema

16 Note 1, .supra, as to hospital expenses. As to
F.(2d) 958 at 963, note 7.
17 The Federal Employees' Compensation Act,
§776, and the World War Veterans' Act, 38 U.S.C.
vide for assignment of claim to the government as
under them.

salary, see the principal case, 153
5 U.S.C. (1940)' §§751-800 at
(1940) §§421-576 at §502, proa condition of receiving benefits

